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THE BIN LADEN EXCEPTION
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INTRODUCTION
On the evening of May 1, 2011, the American people learned that the
world’s most wanted criminal—Osama bin Laden—had been killed in
Pakistan during a covert operation by an elite U.S. military team. 1 The
news triggered spontaneous gatherings and revelry across the country. For
the millennium’s new generation, bin Laden had been the embodiment of
evil—a real-life boogeyman—and, for some, “the first person I was ever
taught to hate.”2 Many young Americans will not be able to recall life
without a deep-seated fear of the terrorist leader and the organization he
founded,3 all against a national backdrop of the so-called “war on terror.”
Bin Laden’s death thus signaled the “end of an era” and progress “toward a
safer, less violent world.”4
After emotions settled, however, thoughts turned to the ultimate impact
of the operation that closed “the Bin Laden decade.”5 The al Qaeda leader
“really did a number on all of us,” wrote New York Times columnist
Thomas Friedman.6 “Who will tell the people how deep the hole is that Bin
Laden helped each of us dig over the last decade—and who will tell the
people how hard and how necessary it will be to climb out?”7 The question
appears ripe in light of recent statements by top officials. Defense
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Secretary Leon Panetta claimed that the United States was “within reach of
strategically defeating Al Qaeda.”8 Shortly thereafter, President Barack
Obama announced that “Al Qaeda is under more pressure than at any time
since 9/11” and that “more than half of al Qaeda’s leadership” had been
taken out.9
The time has come to begin a post-mortem examination, so to speak, of
the damage wrought upon the United States and its people during the
decade of bin Laden. Some, like Friedman, have looked to the international
consequences, including the perpetually troubled relationship among Arab
states, Israel, and the United States, which was undoubtedly worsened by
9/11 and its aftershock. This colloquy contemplates an area of domestic
concern that represents perhaps the most palpable effect of terrorism on the
American citizenry: travel by plane. In his contribution, Professor
Alexander Reinert provides thoughtful analysis of Fourth Amendment
doctrine as applied to airport security.10 Here, I hope to complement his
piece by offering some context on terrorism, with the goal of prompting
discussion as to whether bin Laden’s legacy will include yet another
instance of constitutional exceptionalism.
By definition, exceptionalism is a comparative concept involving a
contrast among sufficiently analogous sets of values and practices, where an
apparent anomaly or special case is subject to descriptive and normative
assessments.11
Elsewhere, I have considered the idea of drug
exceptionalism by examining the unique history and policy of prohibition
and, in particular, the extraordinary treatment of drug crime by legislatures,
law enforcement, and courts.12 The result is a sort of “drug exception” to
the Constitution, where otherwise applicable constitutional rules do not
seem to apply (or are watered down) in the government’s pursuit of
contraband.13 Since 9/11, however, the exceptionalism in America’s “war
on drugs” may have been surpassed by the new “war on terror.”
Indeed, the very use of the term “war” in this context signifies the
extraordinary nature of government efforts, providing a state-sponsored
metaphor to emphasize the seriousness of the threat and the virtue of
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official actions.14 At times, the U.S. has been too heavy-handed—and
occasionally ham-handed as well—in its approach to fighting terrorism,
with important consequences for fundamental rights. The government has
engaged in, for instance, ethnic profiling and related abuses; extended,
incommunicado detention in immigration cases; “enhanced interrogation
techniques” (a.k.a. torture) such as water-boarding; “extraordinary
rendition” of detainees to foreign nations known as human rights violators;
mass wiretapping and data-collection by the National Security Agency; the
maintenance of a quasi-penal colony in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba; and the
extrajudicial, targeted killing of American citizens abroad.15
The full extent of government operations in the aftermath of 9/11 may
never be known, especially since America’s antiterrorism and
counterterrorism16 efforts have been shrouded in secrecy and only partially
revealed by civil rights suits or Freedom of Information Act requests, which
the government has occasionally thwarted by invoking the “state secrets”
privilege.17 Collectively, the government justifies the new policies on the
basis of necessity; a claim the American public has largely accepted at face
value.18 In terms of economic costs, the past decade has occasioned a
trillion dollar increase in expenditures on homeland security alone.19 Bin
Laden’s death thus provides an auspicious moment for level-headed
assessment of these extraordinary government actions in view of the threat
posed by terrorism.
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I. TERRORISM AND RISK ANALYSIS
Of principal concern here is the true nature of the danger to the United
States: Is the menace of terrorism existential, as many government officials
have alleged, threatening the nation’s very existence or at least jeopardizing
the American way of life as we know it?20 Or does it present instead an
unexceptional risk to individual citizens and the country as a whole? The
former might rationalize otherwise forbidden actions as a means of
domestic self-preservation, consistent with the axiom that the Constitution
is not a suicide pact.21 The latter, however, could not justify wholesale
deviations from constitutional principles and practices unless the national
compact binds weakly or not at all.
One way to analyze such claims is to rely on methods of “risk
assessment.” Experts have created these methods to evaluate assorted
dangers to human life—from industrial accidents to nuclear power—by
considering the likelihood and consequences of a given threat and
comparing it to standard benchmarks. Based on the regulatory guidelines in
various developed nations, there seems to be some agreement that a risk is
unacceptable—and therefore may necessitate government action—if the
annual fatality rate is greater than 1 in 10,000 or, in some cases, 1 in
100,000.22 In contrast, a risk is acceptable—requiring no further safety
improvements—if the annual fatality rate is 1 in 1,000,000 (or sometimes 1
in 2,000,000).23
In a recent article, two scholars employed risk assessment techniques
to determine whether the threat of terrorism is, in fact, existential. While
the risk to Americans from cancer and traffic accidents falls within the
lower unacceptable range (1 in 10,000), the annual fatality risk of modern
terrorism is 1 in 3,500,000, making it a lesser threat than deer hunting,
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home appliances, or drowning in a bathtub.24 To be unacceptable, the
number of terrorist-related fatalities would have to increase exponentially,
with the United States “experiencing attacks on the scale of 9/11 once a
year, or 18 Oklahoma City bombings every year.”25 For these and other
reasons, the authors concluded that terrorism is hardly an existential threat
that would justify costly government actions to further reduce the risk.
This assessment applies with full force to the realistic threats to
domestic security posed by al Qaeda (or any other terrorist organization),
which largely involve bombings and shootings using conventional
weapons.26 Even though these acts are undoubtedly appalling, they can be
classified as lethal but non-extraordinary crimes, not existential threats to
the American homeland on par with a military invasion or an internal
insurrection.27 As for the presumably apocalyptic threat of a nuclear attack,
the key question is one of likelihood. While it is true that al Qaeda might
obtain a nuclear weapon (i.e., it is not impossible), several reports have
concluded that the odds remain quite low due to, among other things, the
difficulty of acquiring the necessary materials.28 But even if the risk of
nuclear attack were viable, the appropriate policy stance would be to focus
government efforts on that particular threat and not on all forms of
terrorism.29
The foregoing analysis can help inform an assessment of the topic of
this colloquy: the impact of terrorism on commercial air travel. In the wake
of 9/11, one scholar calculated the risk to individual fliers:
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[L]et us assume that each week one commercial aircraft
were hijacked and crashed. What are the odds that a person
who goes on one trip per month would be in that plane?
There are currently about 18,000 commercial flights a day,
and if that person’s trip has four flights associated with it,
the odds against that person’s being on a crashed plane are
about 135,000 to 1. If there were only one hijacked plane
per month, the odds would be about 540,000 to 1.30
Even under these hyperbolic conditions, the theoretical risk to the
individual flier is still just a fraction of the real risk to the individual driver.
The nation’s failure to appreciate comparative risks can produce perverse
results. One study estimated that 1500 people died in the year after 9/11
because Americans moved from the safest form of travel (flying) to the
most dangerous (driving) in order to avoid the fate of those who perished
during the terrorist attacks.31 A later study questioned these findings, only
to offer another disturbing sequence of events: instead of additional road
miles, the proximate cause for increased fatalities was heightened stress
among those living in the Northeast, adjacent to the site of the attacks, who
used and abused drugs and alcohol at a higher rate after 9/11, affecting road
safety.32 Either way, Americans were acting contrary to their individual and
collective interests.
Why would presumably rational actors behave in this manner? The
answer is that people are not always rational, at least as the term is
conceived in the classical microeconomic model.33 Fear and other intensely
negative emotions can affect public policy by distorting the perception of
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harmful due to adverse reactions and increased antibiotic resistance. See, e.g., U.S. Food and Drug
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(Nov.
14,
2001),
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organisms, and the usefulness of Cipro as an antibiotic may be lost.”) (link).
33
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risk and the evaluation of potential responses.34 In particular, lowprobability risks that are perceived to be catastrophic, uncontrollable, and
distributively inequitable—so-called “dread risks,”35 such as the supposed
dangers of nuclear power—tend to engender higher levels of fear than risks
that are, in truth, more likely and more lethal. And because humans often
assess risks based on mental associations, with horrific images tending to be
associated with greater risks, media coverage can amplify such images and
the related risk perception. At times, this fosters mistaken beliefs that a
consensus has been reached on the nature of a threat, the need for action,
and the propriety of the chosen response. Unsurprisingly, political actors
have been inclined to exploit (or at least not question) instances of public
emotionalism in service of their own electoral self-interests.
The underlying risk aversion is understandable, involving a confluence
of psychological, social, institutional, and even evolutionary factors.36 But
it hardly makes for sound public policy, understood to be decision-making
based on, among other things, an informed ranking of risks and a costbenefit analysis of possible options, all within the structural limitations of
government and with respect for individual rights. This public policy
approach seeks to allocate scarce resources to increase public safety in fact,
rather than creating the illusion of greatly enhanced security at the price of
diverting efforts from those risks that can be meaningfully reduced. It also
recognizes that one of the core purposes of a constitution is to protect the
fundamental rights of individuals and the long-term interests of society
against rash, emotional decisions in the face of perceived perils.37
Today, public perception of terrorism and the post-9/11 governmental
reaction are prime examples of public policy driven by fear rather than
rational decisionmaking. “Terrorism” as both a word and a concept evokes
intense, tragic images that tend to preclude rational risk assessments based
on the available information.38 The resulting fear is exacerbated by various
factors, including the stochastic nature of terrorism, the terrorists’ use of
indiscriminate, lethal weapons, and their willingness to target civilians who
lack meaningful control over the risk of attack.39 As mentioned above, the
34
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CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 22–28, 32–34 (2010) (link); see generally PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK
(2000); SUNSTEIN, supra note 30, at 89–107.
35
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36
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37
See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (link); THOMAS M.
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE
POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 54–55 (1868) (link); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION
OF LIBERTY 179–80 (1960).
38
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Matrix to Augment Resilience, 8 J. HOMELAND SECURITY & EMERGENCY MGMT. 1, 3–4 (2011) (link).
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federal government has responded in kind with unprecedented policies and
practices, in terms of the resources expended and the infringements on
individual rights.
To be sure, al Qaeda’s threat has not disappeared, a point duly noted by
President Obama and his national security team, as well as by foreign
dignitaries.40 Interpol still considers al Qaeda the world’s biggest terrorist
security threat, and it was only a year ago that London was reported as a
possible target for a “dirty bomb” (i.e., a conventional explosive mixed with
radioactive material).41 On this side of the Atlantic, national security
experts and law enforcement officials have long warned about the prospect
of an attack in the United States on or around the ten-year anniversary of
9/11. Thankfully, the threats never materialized. Yet even if they had, it
would still not justify perforce the suspension of individual rights and the
implementation of an antiliberal program of state surveillance and control.
Again, the critical issues for risk analysis are those of scale and probability.
While al Qaeda undoubtedly remains a menace, it has been weakened
in recent times and does not present an existential threat to the United
States.42 The Obama Administration seemed to admit as much in its
guidelines on commemorating the ten-year anniversary of 9/11: although
terrorists “still have the ability to inflict harm, . . . Al Qaeda and its
adherents have become increasingly irrelevant.”43 Since 9/11, the capture or
killing of key figures in al Qaeda operations—including, of course, bin
Laden himself—has substantially downsized the threat posed by the
organization.44 Al Qaeda is thus a fundamentalist organization in decline,
still bent on wreaking havoc and using fear as political tools, but incapable
40
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Aug. 29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/30/us/politics/30terror.html?pagewanted=all (link).
44
See, e.g., Alison Fitzgerald, Bin Laden Death Means Most Sept. 11 Terror Conspirators Killed or
Captured, BLOOMBERG, May 3, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-04/bin-laden-deathmeans-most-sept-11-terror-conspirators-killed-or-captured.html (link); Agence France-Presse, Al-Qaeda
Leaders Who Have Been Killed or Captured, ABS-CBN NEWS, May 2, 2011, http://www.abscbnnews.com/global-filipino/world/05/02/11/al-qaeda-leaders-who-have-been-killed-or-captured (link);
Tom A. Peter, Killing of Al Qaeda’s No. 2 a Hammer Blow to Weakening Group, CHRISTIAN SCI.
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of achieving its goals,45 at least directly. Instead, the real “existential”
threat to the United States—the one that endangers the American way of
life and the nation’s particular form of constitutional governance—is not al
Qaeda itself, but political reactions to al Qaeda that trade fundamental
liberties for the pretense of greater security.
II. THE TSA REGIME AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Turning again to the topic of this colloquy, the airport search regime
adopted by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) provides a
poignant example of irrational policy responses to improbable future
terrorist attacks. As an initial matter, many experts anticipate that the next
organized plot against America will involve something other than
commercial aircraft, such as coordinated bombings in public places.46 For
the sake of argument, however, let’s assume that al Qaeda still seeks to use
its single most successful modus operandi, keeping in mind that 9/11 could
and should have been prevented by government officials (i.e., it was not
inevitable under the then-existing legal regime),47 and that the TSA’s
actions could, at best, merely decrease the likelihood of an already minute
chance of another 9/11-type event.
The question, then, is whether the threat of aircraft terrorism and the
presumed risk reduction of the TSA regime48 justify the infringement upon
45
See, e.g., BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, STRAY DOGS AND VIRTUAL ARMIES: RADICALIZATION AND
RECRUITMENT TO JIHADIST TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 9/11, at 1 (2011), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP343.pdf (“[D]espite al Qaeda’s intensive
online recruiting campaign [for homegrown jihadists], their numbers remain small, their determination
limp, and their competence poor.”) (link); HUMAN SECURITY REPORT PROJECT, HUMAN SECURITY
BRIEF
2007,
at
5
(2008),
available
at
http://www.hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/HSB2007/2007HumanSecurityBrief-FullText.pdf
(link);
NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, supra note 28, at 69–70 (concluding that al Qaeda may “decay sooner
than many people think” and “support for terrorist networks in the Muslim world appears to be
declining”); Scott Shane, Rethinking Our Terrorist Fears, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/weekinreview/27shane.html?pagewanted=all (noting that terrorism
experts believe al Qaeda and its jihadist agenda are in decline in the Muslim world) (link).
46
Cf. John Arquilla, Op-Ed., The Coming Swarm, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/opinion/15arquilla.html?scp=1&sq=John Arquilla The Coming
Swarm&st=cse (“[A] new ‘Mumbai model’ of swarming, smaller-scale terrorist violence is emerging.”)
(link).
47
See Luna, supra note 15, at 115.
48
One can debate whether TSA efforts have reduced the threat of terrorism to passenger flights at
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INCREASING PROCUREMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE ADVANCED IMAGING TECHNOLOGY, BUT
CHALLENGES TO THIS EFFORT AND OTHER AREAS OF AVIATION SECURITY REMAIN 8–10 (2010),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10484t.pdf (link); Reinert, supra note 10, at 212–13; Grant
Stinchfield, TSA Source: Armed Agent Slips Past DFW Body Scanner, NBC DALLAS-FORT WORTH,
Feb. 21, 2011, http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/TSA-Agent-Slips-Through-DFW-Body-ScannerWith-a-Gun-116497568.html (link).
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individual rights. The most controversial development has been described
by one policy expert as a “strip/grope” procedure.49 It begins with the
TSA’s use of “Advanced Imaging Technology” (AIT), which is supposed to
screen for both metallic and nonmetallic threats such as explosives and
other weapons. But as passengers pass through a booth that uses either
millimeter wave or backscatter technology, far more is revealed than guns
and bombs.50 These “porno scans” or “strip-search machines,” as some
critics have labeled them, create full body images of passengers.51
Some travelers may have no problem with their bodies being exposed
in this manner (might exhibitionists and flashers even enjoy it?).52 Heavy
criticism from across society, however, suggests that many people object to
these created outlines of their naked physique, which detail breasts,
buttocks, genitals, and other curves and crevices.53 These are the precise
body parts one intentionally covers for reasons of personal privacy, social
etiquette, and, not least of all, criminal liability for indecent exposure. In an
earlier era, these types of pictures might have been held obscene under First
Amendment doctrine; today, the images are part of the TSA’s imposition on
travelers, giving a new meaning to the term “federal mandate.” The
technology is coupled with enhanced frisks that might be hard to
differentiate from an assaultive grope. Professor Reinert notes several
reported abuses, like a sixty-one-year-old bladder cancer survivor who was
subjected to such a violent frisk that his urostomy bag broke, leaving him
covered in his own urine.54 Other outrageous stories include an eight-

49
Jim Harper, Legislation to Protect the Rights of Travelers, CATO INST., Mar. 30, 2011,
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12924 (link).
50
For what it is worth, here are pictures provided by the government as to “what TSA sees”:
http://www.tsa.gov/graphics/images/approach/mmw_large.jpg (millimeter wave technology) (link);
http://www.tsa.gov/graphics/images/approach/backscatter_large.jpg (backscatter technology) (link). Far
racier images are available on the Internet.
51
See Reinert, supra note 10, at 210–11; Harper, supra note 49.
52
On the lighter side, one passenger had written the text of the Fourth Amendment across his chest,
which he revealed to TSA agents when he was subjected to an enhanced secondary screening.
Apparently, the TSA agents did not find this funny; they radioed the police and had the passenger
arrested. Tobey v. Napolitano, No. 3:11CV154–HEH, 2011 WL 3841929, at *1–2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 30,
2011).
53
Apparently, the imaging technology can also detect a woman’s sanitary napkin. Joe Sharkey,
Screening Protests Grow as Holiday Crunch Looms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/16/business/16road.html?sq=sharkey
screen
protests&st=cse&adxnnl=1&scp=3&adxnnlx=1326996096-SAbPsavC5aJLq86a+OLDDw (link).
54
Reinert, supra note 10, at 211. Similar stories involve mistreatment of breast cancer survivors.
See, e.g., Brad Hyatt & Molly Grantham, After Removing Prosthetic Breast, Flight Attendant Says TSA
Goes “Too Far”, WBTV NEWS, Nov. 18, 2010, http://www.wbtv.com/Global/story.asp?S=13534628
(link); Breast Cancer Survivor Lori Dorn Says She Endured ‘Humiliating’ Pat-Down at JFK, CBS NEW
YORK, Oct. 4, 2011, http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/10/04/breast-cancer-survivor-lori-dorn-says-sheendured-humiliating-patdown-at-jfk/ (link).
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month-old baby frisked by TSA agents and a ninety-five-year-old woman
who was forced to remove her adult diaper.55
In addition, some have claimed that TSA agents employ enhanced
frisks in a punitive or retaliatory fashion, reserving them for those who
object to being scanned by the new imaging machines.56 Indeed, the TSA
appears to license heavier scrutiny of those who dispute the agency’s
authority.
Pursuant to the “Screening Passengers by Observation
Technique,” or “SPOT,” TSA agents are instructed to look for “behavioral
indicators” of stress, fear, or deception.57 Of the seventy indicators, perhaps
the most vexing and legally questionable basis for enhanced scrutiny is
when the passenger is “[v]ery arrogant and expresses contempt against
airport passenger procedures.”58
If nothing else, this encourages

55
Joy Jernigan, Baby Receives Pat-Down at Kansas City Airport, MSNBC, May 11, 2011,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42978267/ns/travel-news/t/baby-receives-pat-down-kansas-city-airport/
(link); TSA Stands by Officers After Pat-Down of Elderly Woman in Florida, CNN, June 26, 2011,
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-26/us/florida.tsa.incident_1_pat-down-tsa-pat-downs-tsaofficer?_s=PM:US (link). After initially claiming that “screening procedures were followed,” TSA
officials recently apologized for strip searches of two ailing elderly women at JFK International Airport.
Rich Schapiro, TSA Admits Strip Search Screwup, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 18, 2012,
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2012-01-18/news/30641168_1_tsa-agent-screeners-markey (link).
56
Charlie Leocha, TSA Admits to Punishing Travelers, CONSUMER TRAVELER, Aug. 24, 2010,
http://www.consumertraveler.com/today/tsa-admits-to-punishing-travelers/ (link). As an aside, the TSA
recently detained U.S. Senator Rand Paul for two hours after he set off a scanner alarm and refused a
full body pat-down. See, e.g., Matthew Boyle, Rand Paul on TSA Detainment, DAILY CALLER, Jan. 24,
2012, http://dailycaller.com/2012/01/23/rand-paul-on-tsa-detainment-i-was-barked-at-do-not-leave-thecubicle/ (link). In theory, at least, Senator Paul’s detention could have violated the Speech or Debate
Clause of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
57
Mike M. Ahlers & Jeanne Meserve, TSA Security Looks at People Who Complain About . . . TSA
Security,
CNN,
Apr.
15,
2011,
http://www.cnn.com/2011/TRAVEL/04/15/tsa.screeners.complain/index.html?iref=allsearch (link).
58
Id. For all the flying public knows, criticism of TSA agents could result in one’s inclusion on the
federal government’s “no-fly list,” which would lead to delays and even detention during subsequent
journeys through airport security. As outlandish as this seems, it must be remembered that the no-fly list
doubled in size over the past year, with about one thousand changes made to the government’s watch list
each day. Eileen Sullivan, U.S. No-Fly List Doubles in One Year, TIME, Feb. 2, 2012,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2105958,00.html (link).
Compare Peter Eisler,
Terrorist
Watch
List
Hits
1
Million,
USA
TODAY,
Mar.
10,
2009,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-03-10-watchlist_N.htm (reporting that watch list had
grown to one million names) (link), with Myth Buster: TSA’s Watch List is More than One Million
People Strong, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/approach/mythbusters/tsa_watch_list.shtm
(disputing report) (link). Among others, Senator Ted Kennedy was on the list, as well as Nelson
Mandela, whose name was only removed by an Act of Congress. Jon Hilkevitch, New Airport Security
Rules
to
Require
More
Personal
Information,
CHI.
TRIB.,
Mar.
9,
2009,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-03-09/news/0903080245_1_no-fly-lists-personal-datapassengers (link); Mandela Off U.S. Terrorism Watch List, CNN, July 1, 2008,
http://articles.cnn.com/2008-07-01/world/mandela.watch_1_president-mandela-apartheidanc?_s=PM:WORLD (link). It might also be noted that the SPOT program has been dogged by
allegations of ethnic profiling. See Joe Davidson, Lawmaker Challenges TSA on Claims of Ethnic
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complaisance among passengers, who may submit when faced with
questionable TSA conduct in hopes of avoiding more intense inspections or
just to get the whole thing over with.
Given the aforementioned risk analysis, an authoritarian strip/grope
procedure seems hard to justify. The current regime strikes at core
constitutional values, including the protection of bodily autonomy and
privacy. In a very real sense, law-abiding citizens are treated like inmates.59
The abuses also undermine a basic component of the rule of law—freedom
from government caprice and vindictiveness.
The “right to defy
submissiveness”60 lays low in the hushed silence of travelers hoping to
avoid the ire of a TSA agent, who appears as the spitting image of the petty
tyrant to which the Bill of Rights is addressed. To the diminution of
individual rights, add the billions of dollars spent on new technology and
government personnel (and don’t forget the consumption of the travelling
public’s valuable time).61 The cost side of the liberty/security ledger looks
staggering when set against the minimal benefit (if any) provided by the
TSA regime, keeping in mind that the appropriate baseline is not a securityless, walk-straight-on-the-plane approach, but instead the pre-9/11 status
quo62 or some other less intrusive, less expensive arrangement.63

Profiling, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/lawmaker-challengestsa-on-claims-of-ethnic-profiling/2011/11/28/gIQAtOiO6N_story.html (link).
59
See, e.g., Harper, supra note 49 (“The search that American travelers undergo at the airport is as
intimate as what prisoners in American jail cells get.”).
60
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972) (link).
61
Harper, supra note 49. Balancing in this context can raise issues of commensurability and
comparability, which are beyond the limited scope of this article. See generally Virgílio Afonso da
Silva, Comparing the Incommensurable: Constitutional Principles, Balancing and Rational Decision,
31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 273 (2011) (link); Symposium, Law and Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 1169 (1998).
62
The pre-9/11 techniques employed by the TSA’s predecessor, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), included requiring passengers to pass through a magnetometer, x-raying their
baggage, and, if necessary, subjecting them to a sweep by a hand-held metal detector or even a light patdown. See, e.g., United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1242–43 (9th Cir. 1989)
(describing the history and public expectations of standard airport screening, as well as an
unconstitutional expansion of that process) (link).
63
To its credit, the TSA recently unveiled new software for AIT machines that does not produce
detailed images of an individual passenger’s body. Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin., TSA Takes
Next Steps to Further Enhance Passenger Privacy (July 20, 2011), available at
http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2011/0720.shtm (link).
The new software automatically detects potential threats and indicates their
location on a generic, computer-generated outline of a person that appears on a
monitor attached to the AIT unit. As with the current version of AIT, if a
potential threat is detected, the area will require additional screening. If no
potential threats are detected, an “OK” appears on the monitor with no outline,
and the passenger is cleared.
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The current regime also clashes with decent understandings of the
Fourth Amendment. By this, I mean interpretations that take seriously the
presumptive requirements of judicial authorization and individualized
suspicion for government searches and seizures,64 and therefore do not
reduce the constitutional provision to a paper right. As mentioned in the
introduction, Professor Reinert’s contribution provides an excellent review
of this legal doctrine. In particular, I agree with much of his analysis
regarding three rubrics for evaluating the TSA regime: consent,
reasonableness balancing, and “special needs.” Although any number of
thoughts and suggestions might be added to the mix, here are just a few
points of emphasis for further discussion:


Today, commercial air travel is ubiquitous in the
United States, with over 600 million passengers
taking more than 9 million flights each year.65 Flying
by plane is not merely a luxury, and it certainly is not
some type of government privilege.
Instead,
commercial flight is a major (and literal) vehicle of
business, and at times it is a necessity of modern life.
Unless society is willing to tolerate Constitution-free
zones, or a Fourth Amendment interpretation sealed
in pre-twentieth-century amber, a passenger cannot
be said to shed his rights simply by choosing to travel
by plane.66

Id. The TSA has also espoused “a more risk-based approach to secure our nation’s transportation
systems,” implemented through a series of new airport security programs.
Terrorism and
Transportation Security: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Transp. Sec. of the H. Comm. on
Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 3–4 (Feb. 10, 2011) (statement of John S. Pistole, Administrator, TSA)
(link). However, the new software does not address concerns about abusive pat-downs, the
effectiveness and rights implications of new schemes such as TSA’s “chat down” program, or the
expansion of TSA checkpoints and searches to other forms of mass transportation. See, e.g., Brian
Bennett, TSA Screenings Aren’t Just for Airports Anymore, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/20/nation/la-na-terror-checkpoints-20111220 (link); Bart Jansen,
Next Layer of Air Security: Chat-Downs on Top of Pat-Downs?, USA TODAY, Oct. 14, 2011,
http://travel.usatoday.com/flights/post/2011/10/next-layer-of-air-security-chat-downs-on-top-of-patdowns/553721/1 (link). Moreover, the constitutional damage may already have been done by judicial
acceptance of the TSA’s post-9/11 regime. See infra notes 75–76, 81–86 and accompanying text.
64
See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (link); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (link); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (link); Jones v. United
States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958) (link).
65
TranStats, RES. & INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP.,
http://www.transtats.bts.gov/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2012) (link).
66
Cf. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–52 (rejecting the notion of “constitutionally protected areas” as a
talismanic solution to Fourth Amendment issues, noting that the defendant did not “shed his right to
[exclude the uninvited ear] simply because he made his calls from a place where he might be seen,” and
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The notion that a passenger implicitly consents to
any TSA search by entering the security queue is no
truer than the idea that a person implicitly consents to
government eavesdropping by using his cell phone,
for example, or that he implicitly consents to police
rummaging through his car and its contents simply by
getting behind the wheel.67 The scope of consent
obviously matters a great deal in the analysis. It is
one thing to x-ray a handbag or backpack, a routine
process in various contexts beyond airport security
(e.g., entering government buildings). But it is quite
another matter to create images of a passenger’s nude
body, which would seem to be the kind of intrusive
search that requires individualized suspicion and
possibly judicial approval.68 In this analysis, public
knowledge of the TSA program and the concomitant
conditioning of the traveler’s expectations should be
largely irrelevant. To hold otherwise would mean
that the government need only announce a search
regime in order for it to be constitutional.69



In theory, airport security measures might be checked
by the type of balancing approach adopted in Terry v.
Ohio70 or by the “special needs” doctrine that Terry
helped inspire. In criminal procedure, however, the
results of an all-things-considered weighing process
tend to be preordained by a heavy thumb on the
government side of the scale. As I have written

holding that a narrower interpretation would “ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to
play in private communication”).
67
Cf. United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806–07 (1974) (“To make one choose between
flying to one’s destination and exercising one’s constitutional right [to waive consent] appears to
us . . . in many situations a form of coercion, however subtle.”) (link); id. at 807 n.14 (“[I]f the
government were to announce that hereafter all telephones would be tapped, perhaps to counter an
outbreak of political kidnapings [sic], it would not justify, even after public knowledge of the
wiretapping plan, the proposition that anyone using a telephone consented to being tapped.”); United
States v. Kroll, 481 F.2d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 1973) (“Compelling the defendant to choose between
exercising Fourth Amendment rights and his right to travel constitutes coercion; the government cannot
be said to have established that the defendant freely and voluntarily consent to the search when to do
otherwise would have meant foregoing the constitutional right to travel.”) (link).
68
See Reinert, supra note 10, at 223–224.
69
See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (link).
70
392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968) (link).
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elsewhere, the constant pressure of law enforcement
has largely eviscerated whatever safeguards Terry
might have provided, to the point that it effectively
stands for the proposition that officers may stop any
person at any time for any reason, or for no reason at
all.71 In turn, the special needs test is so malleable as
to be little more than license for judicial adhocracy,
evidenced by the hodgepodge of court decisions that
often point in different directions.72 To this day, the
line between “special” and “normal” needs of law
enforcement remains obscure. Moreover, it has
always been curious (to me, at least) that a state
actor’s inability to otherwise meet the requirements
of the Fourth Amendment is used as an argument in
favor of dispensing with those requirements.73
Professor Reinert is spot-on when he says that the TSA’s new regime
is “difficult to square with fundamental Fourth Amendment principles,”
while the argument for finding it unconstitutional is “relatively
straightforward.”74 He is also correct that the courts will feel obliged to
uphold the regime—maybe out of deference to the post-9/11 executive
branch or simply to avoid the appearance of impeding efforts to prevent
terrorism—while distorting search and seizure doctrine as needed along the
way. This past July, the D.C. Circuit held that the use of AIT scanners did
not violate the Fourth Amendment.75 The court labeled passenger screening
as an administrative search, which only requires that the governmental
interest in safety outweighs the passenger’s interest in privacy. “That
balance clearly favors the Government here,” the panel concluded, noting
that the AIT scanners can detect non-metallic explosives, the images
produced are “distort[ed]” and immediately deleted, and passengers may
71
Erik Luna, Hydraulic Pressures and Slight Deviations, 2009 CATO S. CT. REV. 133, 140 (link);
see also Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., at 2, Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 01034 (SAS)
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2010), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Expert_Report_JeffreyFagan.pdf
(finding that the New York City Police Department employs Terry stops in a racially discriminatory
manner) (link).
72
See, e.g., Erik Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 876–88 (1999) (link); cf.
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 639 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
special needs doctrine turns search and seizure law into a “patchwork quilt”) (link).
73
See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 724–25 (1987) (link); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (link).
74
Reinert, supra note 10, at 209.
75
Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (link).
Several challenges to the use of AIT scanners (as well as aggressive pat-downs) have been dismissed
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 46110, which provides federal appellate courts exclusive jurisdiction to review
TSA orders. See Roberts v. Napolitano, 798 F. Supp. 2d 7, 10–11 (D.D.C. 2011) (link).
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choose to be frisked instead.76 The opinion’s terse analysis of a highly
contentious issue in a high-profile case speaks volumes about the level of
deference that the TSA will receive from the courts.
As such, Professor Reinert’s instinct—preventing gratuitous damage to
the Fourth Amendment—is laudable. Moreover, his proposed doctrinal
limitation is quite attractive, calling for the suppression of evidence found
during special needs searches in ensuing prosecutions unrelated to the
special need itself.77 For instance, a bag of marijuana uncovered during the
TSA screening process would be excluded from a subsequent drug case.
Actually, I would like to apply this doctrinal move more generally as a
(partial) solution to the most troubling forms of pretextual investigations,
such as police detentions ostensibly for minor infractions (e.g., most traffic
stops) used as an excuse to search for more serious but unrelated offenses
(e.g., scouring a vehicle to find drugs).
Unfortunately, these types of proposals face significant hurdles in
existing caselaw.78 Professor Reinert notes that the Supreme Court has not
decided the question of “whether an administrative search regime that
routinely generated evidence for prosecution could be upheld under ‘special
needs.’”79 In order to avert evidentiary suppression, a negative answer
might simply force the judiciary to rely upon a different doctrine, including
those grounds that Reinert believes to be more disruptive of search and
seizure principles (i.e., consent and reasonableness balancing). This is not
just idle speculation, however.
Far from broadening the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule, the Roberts Court has chipped away at this
rule with the apparent goal of eliminating it altogether.80
Given post-9/11 terrorism anxieties, it is unsurprising that antiexclusionary rule sentiments are particularly powerful in the context of
airport security. For example, two recent appellate court decisions—one
federal and the other state—upheld TSA searches that uncovered evidence
of child pornography in checked baggage.81 In each case, agents opened the
76

Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10.
See Reinert, supra note 10, at 220–25.
78
See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811–12 (1996) (refusing to invalidate a traffic
stop as a pretextual investigation) (link); United States v. McCarty, 648 F.3d 820, 830–31 (9th Cir.
2011) (link); United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 617 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The mere fact that a
screening procedure ultimately reveals contraband other than weapons or explosives does not render it
unreasonable, post facto.”) (link); 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.6(h) 5 (4th ed. 2004).
79
Reinert, supra note 10, at 228 n.109.
80
See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–29 (2011) (link); Herring v. United States, 555
U.S. 135, 139–48 (2009) (link); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 590–94 (2006) (link).
81
See McCarty, 648 F.3d at 823–24; Higerd v. State, 54 So. 3d 513, 515 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010),
reh’g denied (Feb. 4, 2011), review denied 64 So. 3d 1260 (Fla. 2011) and cert. denied, 132 S. Ct 521
(2011) (link).
77
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baggage and removed a folder containing documents, which they then
inspected, supposedly looking for thin, flat charges known as “sheet
explosives.” Photographs found in the respective folders served as the basis
for subsequent criminal prosecutions. Both appellate decisions agreed that
the agents had conducted an administrative search that requires neither a
warrant nor individualized suspicion, because it was “no more extensive nor
intensive than necessary, in the light of current technology, to detect the
presence of weapons or explosives” and was “confined in good faith to that
purpose.”82
This federal decision is troubling on a number of fronts. In effect, TSA
agents may now search any and all items in one’s baggage, given the
sweeping claim that explosives “may be disguised as a simple piece of
paper or cardboard, and may be hidden in just about anything, including a
laptop, book, magazine, deck of cards, or packet of photographs.”83
Moreover, evidence of an agent’s impermissible motive—for instance,
searching a bag for contraband wholly unrelated to terrorist threats—will be
ignored so long as the TSA’s “programmatic motive” is airline safety.84
The appellate panel also engaged in a very un-appellate-like parsing of the
record, scrutinizing the district court’s assessments of witness credibility,
refusing to afford the usual deference to a trial judge’s factual findings, and
even (lightly) reprimanding their lower court colleague.85
The federal case may foreshadow judicial acquiescence to the entire
TSA search regime, including the type of intrusive searches discussed
above and all the figurative baggage they carry. To my mind, however, it
was the state court decision that was most telling. After accepting the
predictable arguments in favor of the search in question, the court offered
an alternative rationale to deny the suppression motion: the damning
evidence was admissible pursuant to the “good faith exception” to the
warrant requirement, based on the assumption that a reasonably well-trained
TSA agent would not have known that the search was illegal.86 At a
minimum, this claim fits uncomfortably with the federal appellate court’s
refusal to inquire into an agent’s actual motives for conducting a search.
82
McCarty, 648 F.3d at 831 (quoting United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2007) (en
banc)); accord Higerd, 54 So. 3d at 517.
83
McCarty, 648 F.3d at 825. As an aside, several TSA employees have been caught stealing money
and property from luggage, with one supervisor receiving kickbacks from his subordinate’s crimes.
Logan Burruss, TSA Officers Arrested After Allegedly Stealing $40,000, CNN, Feb. 17, 2011,
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/CRIME/02/16/new.york.tsa.arrests/ (link); Newark TSA Officer Pleads
Guilty
to
Theft
from
Passengers,
REUTERS,
Feb.
14,
2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/14/us-airport-bribes-idUSTRE71D72V20110214 (link); TSA
Agents Arrested in Case of Missing Cash at Airport, REUTERS, Feb. 16, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/17/us-airport-theft-idUSTRE71G08I20110217 (link).
84
See McCarty, 648 F.3d at 832.
85
See id. at 832–38.
86
Higerd, 54 So. 3d at 519 (citing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009)).
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But it does demonstrate a readiness to find a constitutional exception for
post-9/11 airport security and, more generally, antiterrorism measures
designed to prevent another attack.
CONCLUSION
In the end, I just wish everyone would be a bit more honest. What is at play
here is not a previously recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment—
consent, good faith, special needs, and so on—but instead an entirely new
exemption from otherwise applicable requirements, driven by an abiding
fear of al Qaeda and its now-deceased kingpin rather than a reasoned
assessment of terrorism-related risks. Let’s call it what it is: The Bin Laden
Exception to the Constitution. If nothing else, putting a name to the
systematic evasion of the nation’s most hallowed legal text might force
some to face their own irrationality and question the wisdom of bending the
Constitution, as well as spilling vast amounts of blood and treasure, all for
the sake of one evil man and his outlaw organization.
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